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In the context of regional gas infrastruc-
ture development this paper considers the is-
sue of energy security of the countries of East 
Baltic, which depend heavily on a single en-
ergy supplier — Russia. In recent years, the 
countries of the region have announced sev-
eral LNG terminal construction projects. The 
European Union will provide political and 
financial support to only one of these projects. 
The paper explores the role of gas and energy 
in the economy of the Eastern Baltic coun-
tries. The author concludes that the countries 
mostly dependent on Russian gas are Lithua-
nia and Latvia. The announced LNG terminal 
projects are being reviewed in detail. Their 
necessity is estimated from the perspective of 
the current and future demand for natural 
gas, including the terms and conditions of 
contracts concluded with OAO Gazprom. Dif-
ferent scenarios and prospects for individual 
LNG terminal projects and associated pipe-
line infrastructure are evaluated. It is shown 
that the inability of countries to find a politi-
cal compromise on this issue and the terms of 
existing contracts for Russian gas, as well as 
low domestic demand for gas hamper the im-
plementation of a regional LNG terminal pro-
ject even in the long term. 
 
Key words: Baltic region, East Baltic, the 
Baltic States, Russia, the European Union, 
energy sector, energy security, natural gas, 
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Introduction 
 
In the present article the term “coun-
tries of the Baltic Sea region” is used to 
refer to an aggregate of all countries 
having access to the Baltic Sea (except 
for Russia), namely, Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, 
Denmark, and Sweden. We do not in-
clude Russia in this list due to a number 
of reasons. First of all, it is too large in 
terms of its territory, and in this respect, 
it is a player of a greater scale compared 
to other countries of the Baltic Sea re-
gion. Secondly, all other Baltic countries 
are members of the European Union and 
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thus have similar political and socioeconomic development objectives, 
which do not always coincide with those of Russia. Thirdly, the key issues 
considered in the article relate to the sphere of energy, where the tension be-
tween Russia and the European Union is particularly palpable. 
We will also use the term “countries of East Baltic” in a broad sense. In 
certain documents1, the EU brings together its members situated on the east-
ern coast of the Baltic Sea — Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — un-
der the term “Eastern Baltic Sea area” as opposed to West Baltic (Poland, 
Germany, Denmark, and Sweden). On the other hand, a number of research-
ers, for example, L. M. Grigoryev in his work entitled “Competition and co-
operation: the economic prospects of East Baltic” include Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Poland into the region. This is explained by the similarities in 
the socio-economic development of the four countries in the 20th century as a 
part of the “socialist camp” which resulted, in particular, in their late acces-
sion to the EU (all four countries entered the EU in 2004) [1]. Thus, without 
any reservation, only the former countries of the USSR — Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania — can be classified as countries of East Baltic. In this article, 
the concept “countries of East Baltic” will be interpreted in a narrow sense 
according to the above definition of the European Union, since the develop-
ment of political decisions in general and those in the field of energy security 
in particular for all countries of the region is closely connected with the posi-
tion of the European Union, voiced by the European Commission. Neverthe-
less, in a broad sense, we also consider Poland as a country of East Baltic. 
Only these EU countries border Russia; it is the fact that facilitates active 
development of transboundary cooperation and, at the same time, results in 
heavy dependence of the states of East Baltic on Russia’s energy resources. 
Energy is one of the key sectors of the economy of the Baltic States. Issues 
relating to energy security are widely discussed both by the expert community 
and politicians. We consider the problem and prospects of energy security of 
the Baltic Sea region counties, especially, of its eastern part, from the perspec-
tive of natural gas supply. The focus of our study is the development of gas 
infrastructure (in this case, the projects of LNG terminals and gas pipelines 
construction) in the states of East Baltic and its capacity to ensure energy secu-
rity of the aforementioned countries and the region in general. 
In the present study we aim to identify the main features of the gas infra-
structure development projects implemented in the region and assess their 
prospects. We suppose that the number and uncertain nature of the announced 
projects, alongside with the insufficient economic consideration employed to 
justify political ambitions, make the implementation of these projects and as 
well as regional compromise impossible in a short-term perspective. 
The relevance of the article is explained, first of all, by the fact that the 
economies of the countries of East Baltic are heavily dependent on gas, which 
is delivered almost solely from Russia. At the same time there is no substitu-
tion for Russian gas in the Baltics — the only NPP in the region (the Ignalina 
NPP) has been out of operation for several years, whereas the construction of a 
                                                     
1 For example, in the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan, (BEMIP) proposed by 
the president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso at the end of 2008. 
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new one is still questionable. Finland, which has two operating NPPs, and Po-
land, whose energy industry exploits mainly local coal reserves, are more in-
dependent in terms of energy resources. On the other hand, Russian gas supply 
has stably met the regional demand during the two decades of independence of 
the Baltic States following the collapse of the USSR. However, it does not 
mitigate concerns of the population and politicians of the Baltics about the 
need to increase energy efficiency in their countries and reduce the countries’ 
dependence on Russia [2]. Although the aspiration towards the diversification 
of energy resource supply is mostly justified, it is the political aspect that 
serves as the driving force in case of the Baltic LNG terminals. Therefore, the 
regional states are actively looking for an alternative supplier of natural gas. 
 
The significance of Russian gas  
and its import for the countries of the region 
 
Natural gas occupies an important, although not always crucial role in 
the economy of the countries of East Baltic (table 1). Its share in primary en-
ergy consumption of Poland, Finland, and Estonia is 9—13 %. In Latvia and 
Lithuania, the issue of stable gas supply is a question of survival (Russian 
gas accounts for 30 % of primary energy consumption in both countries). At 
the same time, in absolute terms, the three former Soviet republics consume 
not much more than Finland (5.6 billion m3 in 2011 against 4.1 billion m3), 
whereas the leader in this respect is Poland with 17.2 billion m3 per year. 
The share of gas in the electricity mix is the highest in Lithuania and Lat-
via — 64 and 45 % as of 2010 respectively. At the same time, Poland’s elec-
tricity industry is based on coal; the Finnish one broadly uses NPPs and 
HPPs, whereas the Estonian one works on the local oil shale. 
 
Table 1 
 
The share of gas in the energy industry of the countries 
of East Baltic, 2010—2011 
 
Gas share,% 
Year Country 
Gas con-
sumption, 
billion m3 
Primary energy re-
source consumption
Electricity 
mix 
Gas im-
port to 
consump-
tion, % 
Share of 
RF in gas 
import, % 
Finland 4.7 10.5 14.0 100 100 
Estonia 0.7 10.1 2.3 100 100 
Latvia 1.8 33.1 45.1 61.82 100 
Lithuania 3.1 36.0 63.8 99.72 100 2
01
0 
Poland 17.2 12.6 3.1 63.5 89.5 
                                                     
2 In effect, import accounts for 100 % of Latvian and Lithuanian consumption. The 
deviating statistical data given in the table are explained by the injection of gas sur-
plus into the Inčukalns underground has storage (UGS, Latvia) in certain years (for 
example, 2011), and its withdrawal from the storage to meet peal demand in other 
years (for instance, 2010). According to the agreement concluded by the countries 
Lithuania has a quota in this UGS [3]. 
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End of table 1 
 
Gas share,% 
Year Country 
Gas con-
sumption, 
billion m3 
Primary energy re-
source consumption
Electricity 
mix 
Gas im-
port to 
consump-
tion, % 
Share of 
RF in gas 
import, % 
Finland 4.1 9.8 13.1 100 100 
Estonia 0.6 9.1 1.9 100 100 
Latvia 1.6 … … 109.42 100 
Lithuania 3.4 … … 104.12 100 2
01
1 
Poland 17.2 12.5 3.6 68.7 85.7 
 
Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of data collected by the World In-
ternational Energy Agency (IEA). 
 
The states of the Baltic Sea region are, in general, gas deficient; most of 
them have to import gas in order to meet their domestic demand. At the same 
time, Russia holds the leading position among countries exporting gas to 
East Baltic States. Only Poland buys 10—15 % of the imported gas in Ger-
many, at the same time, the country meets more than 30 % of the domestic 
demand through national resources. Other countries of the region depend 
100 % on Russia and interpret this situation as a threat to the sustainability of 
their development. It is especially true in case of Lithuania and Latvia, for 
which the hypothetical problems with Russian gas supply would mean seri-
ous problems for their economy. 
 
The development of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade  
in the Baltic Sea region 
 
As the international natural gas trade develops, the focus is shifting to 
LNG; many countries of the world — especially gas importers interested in 
the diversification of flexible gas supply — have already announced their 
plans to create the necessary infrastructure. Let us analyse the situation de-
veloping in the countries of the Baltic Sea region. 
The first and, as of today, the only regasification terminal on the coast of 
the Baltic Sea was put into operation in Sweden in the town of 
Nynäshamn 50 km to the south of Stockholm in May 2011. Its capacity is only 
470 mln m3 per year. However, it is sufficient to meet 30—35 % of the domes-
tic demand [4]. The terminal also makes it possible to diversify delivery 
routes: LNG is transported to Sweden from Norway, whereas earlier the na-
tional gas demand was met solely through deliveries from Denmark. In No-
vember 2012, it was announced that, another LNG terminal would be con-
structed in Sweden (this time, on the west coast, in the town of Lysekil 100 km 
north of Goteborg) [5]. It is scheduled to be put into operation in spring 2014 
and, judging by the swiftness of construction of the first terminal (the second 
will be built by the same German company — Linde Group), which lasted 
from spring 2009 to spring 2011, the deadline seems to be quite feasible [6]. 
A. Golyashev,  A. Telegin   
 43
In March 2011, the construction of an LNG terminal commenced in the 
city of Świnoujście in north-west Poland. Partially, the cost of construction 
will be covered by the EU subsidies. At the first stage (scheduled to be com-
pleted in the middle of 2014), the terminal capacity will reach 2.5 billion m3 
per year, later it will be increased to 5 billion m3 (2016) and 7.5 billion m3 
(2021). The LNG supply (since 2014) was secured in 2009 through a 20-year 
agreement with the company Qatargas. 
 
LNG terminals in East Baltic 
 
At the same time, in East Baltic, the situation around the development of 
LNG infrastructure is more complicated. In the 2000s, all the countries of the 
region (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland), whose gas consumption is 
fully met by the pipeline deliveries from Russia, entered into active discussion 
of projects for the construction of national regasification terminals (see fig.). 
However, the low domestic demand makes the construction of several termi-
nals excessive, which — alongside the need for the EU financial support — 
gave rise to competition and conflicts between the Baltic States contending the 
right to build an LNG terminal that would cater for the whole region. 
 
 
 
Fig. The prospect of development of gas infrastructure in East Baltic 
 
Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of open data. 
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Lithuania, which started to promote the LNG project in Klaipeda as 
early as 2010, has achieved more in this field than the other countries. 
The construction of an LNG terminal in the Port of Klaipeda was identi-
fied as a priority in the National Strategy for Lithuania’s energy inde-
pendence approved in 2012. The project has already commenced; it is su-
pervised by the Lithuanian company Klaipedos Nafta (70.63 % of its 
shares are publicly owned). The terminal development plan has been de-
veloped and approved. A floating LNG terminal — a storage vessel — 
and gas equipment will be leased out by the Norwegian company Hoegh 
LNG. The vessel of a capacity of 170 thousand m3 will be leased out in 
autumn 2014. The capacity of a 200 mln euros LNG terminal will amount 
to 2—3 billion m3 per year. 
Estonia is considering three options of locating an LNG terminal on its 
territory: it is the ports of Paldiski 40 km west of Tallinn, Muuga (the largest 
port in the country) in the town of Maardu 10 km north-east of Tallinn, and 
Sillamäe in the north-east of the country in the vicinity of the border with 
Russia. The first two options have been largely supported by experts and 
population. 
The Paldiski LNG terminal project was selected by the Estonian company 
Balti Gaas as early as 2010. Detailed documentation was produced later, in 
July 2012; the project was approved by the local Department of the Environ-
ment; the detailed planning of the terminal, which was earlier approved by the 
Paldiski City Council, was discussed in autumn [7; 8]. However, the Estonian 
Fund for Nature (ELF) considered the environmental impact analysis insuffi-
cient and challenged the decision in court. It can become an additional obsta-
cle for the LNG project implementation, the two-year construction works are 
scheduled to be commenced in summer 2013 [9]. 
At the same time, the Muuga LNG terminal, which is designed to be 
constructed in the vicinity of Tallinn, is being actively discussed. The Eler-
ing company (the operator of Estonian electric networks) and Tallinna Sa-
dam (a network of Estonia’s largest ports) signed a cooperation agreement, 
which covers initial works on the design of a terminal in the port of Muuga 
[10]. Later, Elering and Tallinna Sadam signed a memorandum of agree-
ment with the company Vopak LNG (the Netherlands) in order to identify 
the possibility of project implementation; as a result, in September 2012, 
the Danish consulting company Ramboll Oil & Gas A/S announced that, 
according to their analysis, the port of Muuga is the best site for the con-
struction of an LNG terminal in the Baltic area [11]. A little bit earlier, the 
terminal project was approved by the local authorities [12]. The designed 
capacity of the terminal, whose cost the Danish experts assessed at 
221 mln euros, will achieve 90,000 m3, which will make it possible to re-
ceive 3.3 billion m3 per year. 
The third possible site for the construction of an LNG terminal in Esto-
nia — the port of Sillamäe — receives least support both in the expert 
community and among the local population (a public discussion of the pro-
ject took place in spring 2012) [13]. Earlier, in November 2011, the City 
Council of Sillamäe initiated an assessment of the environmental impact of 
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the construction of an LNG terminal of a capacity of up to 2.3 mln t per 
year [14]. 
Latvia still lags behind its Baltic neighbours. There are two prospective 
sites for the construction of an LNG terminal: the capital port of Riga and 
the port of Ventspils, which, unlike the port in Riga, is ice-free [15; 16]. 
Latvia’s claim to the construction of a regional terminal on its territory is 
based on the following arguments: the geographical positions in the centre 
of the region and the only regional underground gas storage Inčukalns, 
which is used for storing gas in order to meet peak demand [17]. Some-
times Latvia returns to the discussion of the plans to construct another 
UGS — this time in Dobele — of a capacity of up to 5—10 billion m3. 
However, Latvia is increasingly inclined to support the construction of an 
LNG terminal in Estonia, with a reservation that it is necessary to use Lat-
vian UGSs [18]. 
Finland (represented by the company Gasum), which announced its firm 
plan to import LNG only in spring 2012, already considered two projects of 
LNG terminals to be constructed on its territory — in the cities of Ingå and 
Porvoo (the port of Sklodvik) [19]. The construction is scheduled to be com-
pleted in 2018. The LNG terminal in Ingå is designed to import 19.2 mln m3 
per day (7 billion m3 per year), that in Porvoo to import 9 mln m3 per day 
(3.3 billion m3 per year). 
 
The Booz & Company report 
on the comparison of regional LNG terminals 
 
In 2012, the European Union, which acts as a sponsor (although only 
partially) and, consequently, an arbitrator in disputes between the Baltic 
States in order to make a well-grounded decision in favour of a certain pro-
ject, had to hire the German consulting company Booz & Company to con-
duct a comparative analysis of all six Baltic projects. In November 2012, the 
European Commission published a report prepared by Booz & Company, 
which presented the results of the analysis. The German experts took into 
account such initial data as the existing capacities of the pipelines between 
the countries, the feasibility of the construction of the Baltic connector (Fin-
land — Estonia) and GIPL (Poland — Lithuania) pipelines, the location of 
the Inčukalns UGS in Latvia, and the volume of gas required to meet the 
domestic demand of the region’s countries. 
According to Booz & Company, the best option is the construction of 
an LNG terminal in Paldiski (Estonia): the aggregate cost of the infra-
structure development will be minimal in this case. In case Lithuania 
completes the GIPL project (alongside the implementation of the LNG 
terminal project in Świnoujście), the country’s gas import will be diversi-
fied without any additional initiatives. Latvia, in its turn, already has an 
UGS. Its reserves make it possible to meet the peak demand in the coun-
try. Estonia is still the least secure country in terms of gas supply, al-
though it is the least dependent state of the three. Moreover, in case of all 
countries of the East Baltic (including Finland), it is Estonia that occu-
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pies the central position. German experts make an additional conclusion 
that the construction of an LNG terminal in Finland, whose demand for 
gas is comparable to the total demand of all the Baltics, is as attractive an 
option as that in Estonia (Paldiski). Moreover, Booz & Company empha-
sise that if neither Balticconnector, nor GIPL are completed, the strongest 
need for a terminal will be that of Lithuania — the largest gas consumer 
in the Baltics. 
Thus, the floating LNG terminal in the port of Klaipeda (Lithuania), 
which is already under construction, is an outsider from the perspective of 
the European Union, since its construction will be more expensive and is 
unlikely to balance the gas pipeline network, whereas the Estonian Paldiski 
and the Finnish Ingå projects are the most cost-effective. The final decision 
on the site of construction of a regional terminal must be made by the 
Working Group on the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan. Finally, 
the most important issue is that of financing — the participation of the 
European Union depends on the achievement of a compromise agreement 
by the Baltics. 
The European Commission will take into account the conclusions of 
Booz & Company. At the same time, the final report stresses that Estonia 
and Finland are equally advantageous sites, which, according to experts, is 
indicative of the existence of a Finnish lobby [20]. However, Lithuania has 
already announced that Klaipedos Nafta will complete its project despite the 
criticism and it can be launched as early as 2014. It is important to note that 
the Klaipeda project decided not to wait for the EU support — it is financed 
from the state budget and loan funds. As a result, several LNG terminals can 
be constructed in the East Baltic. 
 
The development of international gas pipeline infrastructure  
in the region 
 
The gas infrastructure available in the countries of the East Baltic is 
represented, first of all, by pipelines stretching from Russia, which — ei-
ther directly or via Ukraine and Belarus — cater for all Russian gas import 
into the region. At the same time, if we consider the countries of the East 
Baltic within the European Union, the Baltics (although there are internal 
gas pipelines between Lithuania and Latvia and Latvia, Estonia, and 
Finland) resemble “islands” isolated from the rest of the European Union. 
Poland, which is connected by a pipeline network with Germany and the 
Czech Republic, is the only foreign country of East Baltic that imports gas 
not only from Russia, although in quite limited amounts: in 2011, Germany 
accounted for 11 % of Poland’s import; according to the IEA, in 2012, the 
country also imported gas from the Czech Republic and, before 2007, form 
Norway. 
From the perspective of the European Union, whose logic can hardly be 
questioned, an increase in the energy security of the countries of East Baltic 
depends on the development of their gas infrastructure, which pursues two 
objectives: 
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— integration of the gas pipeline systems of Finland and the Baltics; 
— connection of the Baltic States (in the best scenario, including 
Finland) to the gas pipeline network of Poland, which already has access to 
the common European gas market. 
The first objective can be accomplished through the implementation 
of the Balticconnector project — the construction of a gas pipeline, 
which is expected to connect the gas transmission systems of Finland 
and Estonia in 2014—2015 [21]. The pipeline will cross the floor of the 
Gulf of Finland; its capacity will amount to approximately 2.5 billion 
m3 per year. The project is implemented in collaboration with the Fin-
nish Gasum, the Estonian Eesti Gaas, and the Latvian Latvijas Gāze. 
For the first time, Gasum announced its plans to construct a Finnish-
Estonian gas pipeline in July 2006 [22]. The company aspired to gain 
access to the Inčukalns UGS in order to diversify and secure gas supply 
during the peak consumption periods. The pipeline was scheduled to be 
put into operation in 2010 to connect Finland and the Estonian port of 
Paldiski. Later, the discussion of the project came to an end. However, 
in connection with the discussion of the options for the construction of 
an LNG terminal in the East Baltic, Balticconnector became relevant 
once again. In February 2011, Gasum submitted a report on the prelimi-
nary engineering research on the project [21]. Two routes were pro-
posed: the pipe will stretch to Paldiski either from Ingå or the port cen-
tre of Vuosaari in Helsinki. In the first case, its length will reach 80 km, 
in the second 140 km. It is likely that the first route will be chosen 
against the background of the construction of a large (on a regional 
scale) regasification terminal in Ingå to secure supply to the Baltics, 
whereas the second will be chosen in case the terminal is erected either 
in Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania to secure supply to the capital region of 
Finland. According to Gasum, the project cost will amount to 96 mln 
euros. The financing structure and the degree of EU participation will 
be identified later; however, the government of Estonia lays great em-
phasis on it [23]. The above mentioned report by Booz & Company de-
scribes other possible routes: Ingå — Paldiski and Ingå — Tallinn, 
whereas the pipeline cost is assessed at 141 mln euros; in case of the 
construction of an LNG terminal in Lithuania or Latvia, the report con-
siders the Balticconnector project unpractical. The final route of Baltic-
connector will be identified later, when the countries reach an agree-
ment on the site of construction of a regional LNG terminal. 
The second objective of the European plan for gas pipeline infrastruc-
ture development in the countries of East Baltic differs from the first one 
dramatically. It concerns the GIPL (Gas Interconnection Poland — Lithua-
nia) overland pipeline, which will connect the gas transmission systems 
(GTS) of the Baltics and Poland via Lithuania along the Warsaw — Vil-
nius route [24]. According to the project presented by the companies Lie-
tuvos dujos (Lithuania) and Gaz-System (Poland) in February 2012, the 
pipeline length will reach 562 km. The pipeline will stretch from one of the 
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main points of the Polish GTS — the Rembelszczyzna compressor station 
— to the Jauniunai compressor station in Lithuania [25]. The designed ca-
pacity of GIPL is 2.3 billion m3 (it can be doubled in the future), whereas 
its cost is estimated at 471 mln euros (by Ernst & Youngm which con-
ducted the project feasibility study in 2011) or 537 mln euros (by Booz & 
Company). Most part of the investment (approximately ¾) will be made by 
the Polish party, since its territory will accommodate most of the pipe’s 
length (351 km). The construction is expected to commence in 2016; the 
object is scheduled to be put into operation in 2018 [26; 27]. The major 
task of GIPL is to diversify gas supply to Lithuania; gas will be transmitted 
from Poland and, possibly, Germany. At the same time, after the gas pipe-
line is put into operation, Poland will gain access to the Inčukalns UGS in 
Latvia, which will also secure the functioning of the GTSs of the foreign 
countries of East Europe, whereas the Baltics will finally become a part of 
the EU GTS. According to the study conducted by Booz & Company, the 
construction of GIPL can be justified only in case the regional LNG import 
terminal is constructed in Estonia (or Finland), if another one is not built in 
Lithuania. If the first condition might be met, it is very unlikely in the case 
of the second one: the regasification terminal in Lithuania is already under 
construction. The effect of securing gas supply to the Baltics will be 
greater, if GIPL is constructed alongside a number of gas interconnections 
between the Baltics, as well as Balticconnector and an LNG terminal in Es-
tonia or Finland. 
It is interesting to note that four of the five companies participating in 
the Balticconnector and GIPL projects (without which the effect of the 
construction of a regional LNG terminal and other initiatives aimed to re-
duce the dependence of the countries of the region on Russian gas import 
will be insignificant) partially belong to Gazprom. So, 25 % of the shares 
of the Finnish Gasum, 34 % of the Latvian Latvijas Gāze, 37 % of the Es-
tonian Eesti Gaas (Balticconnector), and 37.1 % of the Lithuanian Lietuvos 
dujos (GIPL) are owned by the Russian company. Apparently, the above-
mentioned projects contradict its interests; their implementation may be 
complicated or even obstructed by the Russian company. In order to re-
solve this situation, the Baltics are making attempts at ruling Gazprom out 
of managing their national companies referring to the provisions of the 
EU’s Third Internal Energy Market Legislative Package. So, in June 2012, 
the Riigikogu (Estonian parliament) adopted amendments to the Law on 
Natural Gas, according to which Eesti Gaas must sell the main gas pipe-
lines [28]. The Lithuanian authorities also strive for the division of the Lie-
tuvos dujos assets, which is planned to take place in 2014, after which the 
country’s gas pipelines will be managed by a national operator. In view of 
the traditionally strained relations between Russia and the neighbouring 
countries of the East Baltic region (perhaps, except Finland), this process, 
in which an active role is played by the commercial courts of the countries, 
can take a long time and have an unpredictable effect on the development 
of the gas industry of the Baltic Sea region. 
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The necessity of a LNG terminal construction 
 
An important factor that can affect the development of gas infrastruc-
ture in the region is the existing long-term contracts on pipeline gas supply 
from Russia. Estonia and Lithuania assumed the obligation to buy fuel 
from Gazprom until 2015 inclusive, i. e., for these two countries, the prob-
lem of alternative gas supply since 2016 is already relevant today [29, 30]. 
Finland and Latvia are bound by obligations for longer periods — until 
2025 and 2030 respectively, whereas Poland until 2022 [31—33]. Thus, in 
the near future, in case there is no significant increase in gas consumption 
in the countries of East Baltic, the demand of at least three of them will be 
almost completely met by Gazprom (unless the countries of the East Baltic 
and their companies dispute the “take-or-pay” principle — according to 
which they have to choose a legally binding minimum volume of gas — 
before the commercial court. 
We see that the actual obstacles for the LNG terminal project implemen-
tation (table 2) are created by the economic situation relating to the future 
changes in gas consumption volumes. At the same time, the possibility that 
the regional gas consumption will grow significantly is rather faint. How-
ever, according to some EU estimates, all the countries (except Estonia, 
whose gas consumption is the lowest) will show a decrease or stabilisation in 
the consumption level, which relates to a complex of social, demographic, 
and economic factors [34]. On the other hand, the Booz & Company report 
considers two scenarios: the basic one suggests an insignificant increase in 
the regional gas consumptions, the other one — a more than 50 % increase. 
 
Table 2 
 
LNG terminal and international pipeline projects in the foreign countries  
of East Baltic 
 
Site Country Stage Capacity  billion m3/year 
Ingå Finland Design 7 
Porvoo << << 3.3 
Paldiski Estonia << 3 
Maardu (the port of Muuga) << << 3.3 
Sillamäe << << 2.3 
Riga Latvia << 3 
Ventspils << << 3 
Klaipeda Lithuania Construction 2—3 
Świnoujście Poland << 2.5 
Balticconnector Finland — Estonia Design 2.5 
GIPL Poland — Lithuania << 2.3 
 
Source: compiled by the authors on the basis of open data. 
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The floating LNG terminal is scheduled to be completed in 2014, 
whereas the Lithuanian and Estonian gas contracts with Gazprom expire in 
2015. There is a rather realistic assumption that in a couple of years, the total 
gas consumption in these countries will remain at a level of 4 billion m3 per 
year. Considering the above, the Klaipeda terminal, having a projected ca-
pacity of 2—3 billion m3 per year, will meet at least a half of the demand. 
Taking into account the absence of a common border, the low level of 
gas consumption in Estonia, and Lithuanian, rather than regional character of 
the project in Klaipeda, one can assume that after the construction of the 
terminal, Lithuania will successfully solve the problem of supply diversifica-
tion through the maximum utilisation of its capacity. The country will be 
able to halve the import of Russian gas. 
In a longer-term perspective, provided a successful implementation of 
the local LNG terminal, Balticconnector, and GIPL projects, as well as a bet-
ter connection between the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian GTSs, Booz & 
Company estimates the level of diversification of gas supply to the Baltic 
States (i. e. the share which will be bought outside Russia) at 63 %. The 
share of Russian gas in Polish import will see the smallest reduction (even in 
case the LNG terminal project in Świnoujście is successfully implemented), 
just as a result of high consumption. Finland, in its turn, if the regional ter-
minal is constructed beyond its territory, will receive not more than a half of 
its current consumption volumes via Balticconnector. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The countries of the East Baltic region see the major problem of their gas 
industry in the total dependence on Russia, resulting from the configuration 
of the industry’s infrastructure. This situation — as a potential factor of the 
instability of economy and energy — is inadmissible both for these countries 
(especially Lithuania and Latvia), and the European Union, which does not 
want to put up with the infrastructure isolation of a large part of its territory. 
A specific feature of natural gas as a commodity is based on the com-
plexity of supply diversification. It results in the fact that the development of 
a large number of gas infrastructure objects, especially the international 
ones, comes to a standstill at the design stage. This article describes more 
than 10 LNG terminal and pipeline projects developed in the countries of 
East Baltic. At the same time, it is clear that less than half of them will be 
implemented. So, only on the territory of Estonia, there are three projects for 
the construction of LNG terminals, each of them can not only meet the na-
tional gas demand, but also ensure the satisfaction of peak demand in the 
neighbouring countries of the region (of course, except Russia). It is evident 
that in the conditions of limited internal demand in the region, in the best 
case scenario, only one of these projects will be implemented. 
Alongside strengthening energy security of an individual country and the 
region as a whole, the implementation of the LNG terminal project is eco-
nomically beneficial. For instance, it can result in a stronger standing of a 
state when it comes to energy price regulation, satisfaction of peak gas de-
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mand, an increase in the investment attractiveness of gas-intensive indus-
tries, etc. Unfortunately, the selection of a site for the implementation of a 
regional LNG terminal project is likely to be driven by purely political con-
siderations. Almost all of the abovementioned projects employed profes-
sional analysis and consulting companies that confirmed the feasibility of 
each project. The report of the Booz & Company analysts, which was con-
sidered above, seems to be the most objective. However, even this analysis is 
not void of politicising and subjective opinions. 
The problem of the gas infrastructure reconstruction and the redirection 
of fuel flows within the whole region cannot be solved only by the countries 
of East Baltic. A rather significant factor is political and, even more impor-
tantly, financial support of the European Union. However, the united 
Europe, which is affected by the ramifications of the world financial and 
economic crisis, strives to reduce costs and imposes strict conditions, for in-
stance, the achievement of a compromise on a single LNG terminal. How-
ever, political tension and the desire of each country to have a LNG terminal 
is a significant obstacle in the pathway to such an agreement. This resulted, 
for example, in Lithuania’s virtual sabotage: the country began the construc-
tion of its own terminal and thus put in jeopardy the regional project. 
At the same time, one should not forget that the construction of an LNG 
terminal is not sufficient to solve the problems of the countries of East Bal-
tic. Its effect will be minimal without the development of transport infra-
structure within the Baltic Sea region, including the construction of an un-
derwater pipeline between Finland and Estonia. 
When making forecasts, one should take into account actual facts and 
economic interests of the countries3. So, a hard fact is that the Republic of 
Korea is already constructing a floating LNG terminal, which will be leased 
out to the Lithuanians and installed in the port of Klaipeda. Moreover, Klai-
peda — Jurbarkas gas pipeline is being built in Lithuania (it may be ex-
tended to reach Vilnius). All of these aspects as well as the capacity of the 
terminal, are indicative of the fact that whole project is focused on the satis-
faction of the national needs. It is very likely to be successfully imple-
mented. After the closure of the Ignalina NPP and the emergence of addi-
tional obstacles to the construction of the new Visaginas NPP (which were 
demonstrated by the referendum held in autumn 2012), the country is 
plagued by electricity supply problems much more than the other countries 
of the region. 
The prospects of the construction of a new regional LNG terminal are ra-
ther vague until the expiration of Gazprom’s long-term contracts with Fin-
land, Latvia, and Poland in 2022—2023 (unless the countries succeed in dis-
puting the “take-or-pay” principle or the gas consumption increases). The 
tough competition between the Baltic Sea region states for the right to con-
struct the terminal on their territory, alongside the inability to reach an 
                                                     
3 A vivid example of a political project is the Amber gas pipeline stretching from 
Russia to Poland and Germany via the Baltics, which was actively discussed a few 
years ago. 
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agreement on the project, which is expected to be beneficial for the whole 
region, is indicative of the fact that benefits from turning into a regional gas 
hub are still put by the countries of the Baltic Sea region above their con-
cerns about the dependence on Russian gas, which is emphasised as the main 
reason behind the project implementation. The geographic disunity of the 
region (Finland and Estonia are divided by the Gulf of Finland) reduces the 
possibility of its swift implementation almost to zero, at the same time, forc-
ing the Finnish party to consider the option of a smaller LNG terminal for 
domestic needs. 
As for the development of the gas pipeline system in the region, a failure 
to implement the project of a common East Baltic LNG terminal can also re-
sult in a failure of the Balticconnector project. Moreover, if the European 
Commission acknowledges the Finnish project as the optimal one and pro-
vides financial support for its implementation, Finland will have to invest in 
the Balticconnector construction to justify the regional ambitions, if they are 
really important for the country. 
GIPL, in its turn, is based on more pragmatic considerations — the as-
piration of Poland to gain access to the Inčukalns UGS to satisfy the do-
mestic peak demand and that of Latvia to buy a certain share of gas at 
lower spot prices on the European gas market. For Latvia, whose gas infra-
structure will undergo the least changes in the region, GIPL will be of great 
significance in a mid-term perspective as a means to diversify supply. In 
case of a failure to implement the regional LNG terminal, Balticconnector, 
and even GIPL projects, Estonia will be least affected, since its energy sec-
tor does not strongly depend on gas, whereas the country has significant oil 
shale deposits. In this case, it will be more reasonable to speak of lost prof-
its from gas transit. 
We believe that the most rational location for the regional LNG ter-
minal is Riga. There are several factors in its favour. Firstly, a common 
LNG terminal is meant to primarily solve the problems of Latvia and 
Lithuania. So it should be located on the territory of one of these coun-
tries. Secondly, Riga lies at a distance of a mere 40 km from the Inču-
kalns UGS (and that of 75 km from Dobleme, where another one might 
be built), whereas the cost of constructing the infrastructure necessary to 
transmit LNG from the port to the Baltic GTSs will be rather low. 
Thirdly, the construction of a large gas hub (and LNG terminal and an 
UGS in the geographical centre of the system) can create a cumulative 
effect and, alongside the implementation of the Balticconnector and GIPL 
secure gas supply to the East Baltic. 
However, in our opinion, there is another — rather viable — option of 
gas infrastructure development in East Baltic. One can expect a successful 
implementation of the floating LNG terminal project in Lithuania, and the 
Estonian or Finnish projects that will be supported by the EU. In this case, 
the GIPL project is not likely to be implemented for the following reason: 
within the plan of diversifying gas supply to Lithuania, it competes with the 
terminal project, which has two significant advantages over the former. 
Firstly, it is already under construction and, secondly, there is a wide range 
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of LNG suppliers, which does not hold true for the pipeline from Poland 
(even in view of the liberalised internal market of the European Union). As 
shown above, the implementation of the Balticconnector project largely de-
pends on the construction of an LNG terminal on the coast of the Gulf of 
Finland, which, in its turn, will be oriented towards the Finnish and Latvian 
markets. Thus its implementation period depends on the development of the 
situation around the current contracts with Gazprom. 
If we take no notice of the political component of the problem and con-
sider only the need to satisfy the peak demand for gas, the best decision 
could be the development of UGSs, which is often brought up by Latvia and, 
more seldom, by Lithuania. So, during the design stage of the Nord Stream 
project, Latvia proposed the construction of an overland diverging route so 
that the country could build several large UGSs with a total capacity of tens 
of billions of cubic metres [35]. 
Today, in disputes over the location of a regional LNG terminal, its ca-
pacity and the necessary infrastructure, economic and economic-geog-
raphical arguments are mentioned much more rarely than the political ones. 
Objective reasons hampering the supply of gas to the countries of East Bal-
tic by Russian Gazprom simply do not exist. There are long-term contracts, 
which are very likely to be renewed. A terminal (in case it is build) will 
make it possible to insist on better gas supply conditions. These consid-
erations, as well as a limited internal market (if one does not take Poland 
into account) explain the calm reaction of Gazprom to these developments. 
At the same time, owning shares of national gas companies, Gazprom has 
an opportunity to influence the implementation of their projects, even 
blocking them. The actual situation makes it possible to say that the project 
of a regional LNG terminal will remain at the stage of discussion and ar-
guments for more than one year. 
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